|| Strategic Communication with Decoder Side Information
||Maël Le Treust, CNRS ETIS, France; Tristan Tomala, HEC Paris, France|
||D6-S4-T2: Strategy, Games & Networks
||Monday, 19 July, 23:00 - 23:20
||Monday, 19 July, 23:20 - 23:40
The strategic communication problem consists of a joint source-channel coding problem in which the encoder and the decoder optimize two arbitrary distinct distortion functions. This problem lies on the bridge between Information Theory and Game Theory. As in the persuasion game of Kamenica and Gentzkow, we consider that the encoder commits to an encoding strategy then the decoder selects the optimal output symbol based on its Bayesian posterior belief. The informational content of the source affects differently the two distinct distortion functions, therefore each symbol is encoded in a specific way. In this work, we consider that the decoder has side information. Accordingly, we reformulate the Bayesian update of the decoder posterior beliefs and the optimal information disclosure policy of the encoder. We provide four different expressions of the solution, in terms of the expected encoder distortion optimized under an information constraint, and it in terms of convex closures of auxiliary distortion functions. We compute the encoder optimal distortion for the doubly symmetric binary source example.