|| Towards Secure Over-The-Air Computation
||Matthias Frey, Technische Universität Berlin, Germany; Igor Bjelaković, Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute, Germany; Sławomir Stańczak, Technische Universität Berlin and Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute, Germany|
||D2-S3-T4: Information-Theoretic Security
||Tuesday, 13 July, 22:40 - 23:00
||Tuesday, 13 July, 23:00 - 23:20
We propose a new method to protect Over-The-Air (OTA) computation schemes against passive eavesdropping. Our method uses a friendly jammer whose signal is -- contrary to common intuition -- stronger at the legitimate receiver than it is at the eavesdropper. It works for a large class of analog OTA computation schemes and we give two examples for such schemes that are contained in this class. The key ingredients in proving the security guarantees are a known result on channel resolvability and a generalization of existing results on coding for compound channels.